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Abstract— This work aims to develop a model checking
method to verify the decision making system of Unmanned
Surface Vehicle (USV) in a long range surveillance mission. The
scenario in this work was captured from a long endurance USV
surveillance mission using C-Enduro®, an USV manufactured
by ASV Ltd. The C-Enduro USV may encounter multiple non-
deterministic and concurrent problems including lost commu-
nication signals, collision risk and malfunction. The vehicle is
designed to utilise multiple energy sources from solar panel,
wind turbine and diesel generator. The energy state can be
affected by the solar irradiance condition, wind condition, states
of the diesel generator, sea current condition and states of the
USV. In this research, the states and the interactive relations
between environmental uncertainties, sensors, USV energy sys-
tem, USV and Ground Control Station (GCS) decision making
systems are abstracted and modelled successfully using Kripke
models. The desirable properties to be verified are expressed
using temporal logic statement and finally the safety properties
and the long endurance properties are verified using the model
checker MCMAS, a model checker for multi-agent systems.
The verification results are analyzed and show the feasibility
of applying model checking method to retrospect the desirable
property of the USV decision making system. This method could
assist researcher to identify potential design error of decision
making system in advance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned Surface Vehicles can be defined as unmanned
vehicles, which execute missions in a variety of hydro
environments with least human operation. The guidance,
navigation and control systems (GNC) of USV [1] allow
the marine vessels to follow predefined paths and avoid
hazards autonomously [2] [3] [4] [5], relieving the operators
from the heavy and tedious manual operations. Further
development of USVs are expected to produce tremendous
benefits, such as lower operation costs, improved energy ef-
ficiency, personnel safety and security, extended operational
reliability and precision, as well as increased flexibility in
complex environments, including so called dirty, dull, harsh,
and dangerous missions [6] [7]. To improve the operating
endurance, USVs powered by multiple sources of energy
are developed, utilising solar energy, wave energy or wind
energy [8] [9].
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Because of the critical nature of USV decision making
system in long endurance missions, it is important to ensure
the correctness of the decision making system. Verification
is the process of verifying the correctness of the system
by checking against the specifications [10] [11] [12] [13].
Typical verification processes include simulation, testing,
deductive verification, and model checking [14]. Simulation
is implemented using the abstract model of the system and
testing is performed on the real system. The simulation and
testing are a cost effective way to identify bugs. However,
it is not practically possible to check all cases exhaustively.
Deductive verification is proof-based and it is well recog-
nised by computer scientists. However, it is time-consuming
and can only be performed by the experts in logics and
mathematics. Model checking is a kind of formal verification
methods that are usually used for exhaustive system analyses
automatically to check whether the model of the system
satisfies the desirable properties.
Model checking has been implemented in the verification
of autonomous systems [15] [16] [17] . NASA has developed
model checking techniques for multiple rovers or satellites
[18] [19]. In the work of [20], timed automata have been ap-
plied to model multiple robotic systems, where the properties
are expressed in CTL (Computational Tree Logic) and finally
verified by the Uppaal model checker. The Kripke model
of a single UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) performing
a search mission was modelled in [21] and the properties
expressed in CTL have been verified using Symbolic Model
Checker(SMV). Subsequently, the scenario was extended
to a multiple UAV searching scenario in [22]. A multiple
UAV system monitoring road networks was modelled and
verified in [10]. A group of robots operate with minimal
communication with no priori knowledge of the environment
has been modelled using the Kripke model [23]. The desir-
able properties of co-operation were expressed using Linear
Temporal Logic(LTL) and the properties were finally verified
using SPIN. The integration of model checking methods with
UAV mission planning systems was proposed in [24] and it
enables the autonomy to make decisions by human intent
and provides better feedback to the human when problems
arise. Another USV mission plan verification for a VIP escort
mission was presented in [25] that, in this scenario, multiple
UAVs should monitor and navigate a ground-based VIP
vehicle to follow a road network. The model was built using
PROcess MEta LAnguage(PROMELA), and the properties
were expressed using LTL and verified using SPIN, which
is a multi-threaded model checker.






















of the model checking method on the verification of the
real USV system. The mission considered was captured
from the C-Enduro USV [26] surveillance case, which was
funded by the UK government-backed Small Business Re-
search Initiative (SBRI). This paper presents the process of
modelling the behaviours and the complex reactive relations
among multiple environmental factors, the corresponding
sensors, the energy system, the USV and the GCS decision
making systems. The complex environment is discretised
and abstracted using the Kripke model, which is a formal
and intuitive model in the form of a directed graph [14]
[27]. The behaviours of the USV are also classified based
on the energy required. The desirable properties of the
decision making system are expressed precisely using CTL.
Finally, the feasibility of using the model checker MCMAS
to verify the safety property and the long-endurance/energy-
saving property of the USV decision making system is
demonstrated. The remainder of this paper has the following
structure: The USV mission scenario is presented in section
II. Section III introduces the Kripke models of the environ-
mental factors and the autonomous systems. In section IV,
the desirable properties are expressed using CTL and verified
using MCMAS. Finally, the conclusion and future work are
given in section V.
II. MISSION SCENARIO
The mission scenario and decision making system consid-
ered in this paper were captured from the long endurance
USV, C-Enduro, as depicted in Fig. 1. USV is commanded
by GCS to execute a long range surveillance mission by
following a list of waypoints, which are generated by an
energy efficient path planning algorithm [28] [29] of the
GCS. While USV is following the path, it sends images to the
GCS for analysis. USV may encounter problems including
communication signal loss, collision risk and malfunction.
The decision making systems of the USV and GCS are
required to ensure safety and also maximise the utilisation










Fig. 1: The USV mission with multiple energy sources [26]
III. KRIPKE MODELLING
During the long range marine mission, to model the
complex environment in terms of communication, traffic,
malfunction and energy, we present an approach to discretise
and abstract the environments using non-energy-related and
energy related models, which helps in reducing the state
space. Finally, the Kripke models of the the USV decision
making system and the GCS decision making system are
presented.
A. Kripke models of non-energy-related environmental un-
certainties and the corresponding USV sensors
Non-energy-related environmental factors interacting with
the USV system include communication signal and traffic
information. Malfunction of USV is also modelled as an en-
vironmental factor. The states of the communication signals
can be identified by using heart-beat messages and we call
this signal detection mechanism the communication detector.
Traffic information can be detected by AIS (Automatic Iden-
tification System) sensors. It is assumed that malfunction can
be detected by the USV online and we call this mechanism
as fault detector. In this research, we assume the sensors can
detect the corresponding environmental factors accurately.
1) Kripke models for communication signal and commu-
nication detector: In Fig. 2, the behaviours of the communi-
cation channel between the USV and the GCS can be defined
as two states: communication state and communication lost
state, which are represented by symbol S. The commu-
nication channel is treated as a non-deterministic system,
which means each state at a specific moment may have
multiple possible consequential transitions. For example, the
communication state has two allowed transitions, namely t1
and t3, which transit the current state to communication state
or communication lost state respectively. Similarly, at the
moment of communication lost state, it can also have two
transitions, namely t2 and t4, with the next state as either
communication state or communication lost state. This non-
deterministic model obeys the real situation that the state at










Fig. 2: Kripke model for the communication channel
The conditions for state transitions are given as follow:
• t1, t4: If the communication is normal.
• t2, t3: If the communication state is lost.
The states of the communication channel can be detected
by the communication detector. The states of the communi-
cation detector are defined as communication state detected
and communication lost state detected. The transitions of
detector will take place with the changes of communication
states.
2) Kripke model for collision risks and AIS: Collision
risks can be classified into two categories according to COL-
REGS (International Regulations for Preventing Collisions
at Sea) [30], namely give-way collision risk and stand-
on collision risk. The give-way collision risk and stand-on
collision risk represent the collision scenarios that the USV
should give its way to or keep the way to avoid collision with
the encountered vessel, respectively. Therefore, the traffic
situation can be modelled using three states including no
collision risk, give-way collision risk and stand-on collision
risk. The traffic situation is also a non-deterministic system.
The traffic information can be detected by AIS sensors. The
states of the AIS are defined as no collision risk detected,
give-way collision risk detected and stand-on collision risk
detected. The state transitions of the AIS are triggered by
the transitions of traffic information.
3) Kripke model for fault event and fault detector: The
states of fault events include severe fault, fault and non-fault.
During the long range mission, the USV may encounter
malfunction but can still have the collision avoidance ca-
pabilities. Therefore, a distinction between severe fault and
fault is required to improve the safety of the USV. The
state severe fault is defined to represent that the USV cannot
operate anymore and it will go to standby immediately. The
state fault event is emitted when the USV cannot execute
the path following command but still execute the collision
avoidance command. In this situation, the USV will remain
at the station keeping state. Non-fault means the USV is in
normal operation state. The fault event is also treated as a
non-deterministic system. The states of fault detector include
Severe Fault detected, Fault detected and Non-fault detected.
State transitions happen with corresponding changes of the
fault events.
B. Kripke models of energy-related environmental uncertain-
ties and the USV energy system
Energy-related environmental factors have impact on the
energy generation and include the solar irradiance and the
wind conditions in this work. Instead of modelling these
two factors separately, we name these two factors’ model
as the energy generation condition model by referring to
the total influence of them on the energy system. Since
the vehicle in this work is powered by solar panel, wind
turbine and diesel generator using the natural resources or
the fuel, we name these three equipments as the energy
generation module. The environmental factors that have the
largest impact on the energy consumption is the sea current
that the USV encounters. We modelled the sea current
condition as energy consumption condition model. The states
of the energy generation module and energy consumption
module will contribute to the transitions of the battery level.
Therefore, the whole energy model can be divided into five
sub-models: energy generation condition model, energy gen-
eration module model, energy consumption condition model,
energy consumption module model and battery model.
The energy generation module can be affected by the
energy generation conditions and battery level. The diesel
generator will be turned on or off subject to the status of
battery level. The states of the energy consumption module
model can be affected by the energy consumption condition
(sea current condition) and USV behaviours. Therefore it
is necessary to classify the USV behaviours based on the
energy consumption characteristics. The states of the energy
generation module and the energy consumption module will
contribute to the transitions of the battery level. Finally,
the states of the energy generation module, the energy
consumption module and the battery will affect the decision
making system of the USV.
The energy model used in this scenario is proposed
by referring to the energy consumption specifications and
energy generation specifications of the C-Enduro USV. We
abstracted and discretised the energy consumption model,
energy generation model and battery model by using integers
to represent the amount of the energy, which helps in
reducing the computational state space.
1) Energy generation: Four energy generation condi-
tions are modelled: Very Low Energy Generation Condi-
tion (VLEGC), Low Energy Generation Condition (LEGC),
Medium Energy Generation Condition (MEGC) and High
Energy Generation Condition (HEGC). The energy genera-
tion condition can change from one state to its neighbour
state randomly, as shown in Fig. 3. Correspondingly, there
are four states with the energy generation module: Very
Low Energy Generation (VLEG)(+0), Low Energy Gener-
ation (LEG)(+1), Medium Energy Generation (MEG)(+2)
and High Energy Generation (HEG)(+3). These four states
of energy generation module correspond to the amount of
energy generation that will be added to the battery level. For
instance, when the energy generation condition is in VLEGC
state, the state of the energy generation will be VLEG
correspondingly and the energy added to the battery will
be 0. Note that when the diesel generator is on, the energy
generation state is always HEG. This is defined according to



















Fig. 3: Kripke model for energy generation condition
2) Energy consumption: The energy consumption state is
modelled by discretising the energy consumption condition
state (the sea current state) and classifying the USV state.
The states of the environmental energy consumption condi-
tions and the behaviours of the USV will determine the states
of the energy consumption module. Three environmental en-
ergy consumption conditions are modelled: Low Energy Con-
sumption Condition (LECC), Medium Energy Consumption
Condition (MECC) and High Energy Consumption Condition
(HECC). The energy consumption condition can transit from
one state to its nearby state randomly. The behaviours of
the USV can be classified into three groups according to
the amount of the corresponding energy consumption, which
includes Low Energy Consumption Behaviour (LECB) (Sta-
tion Keeping (SK)), Medium Energy Consumption Behaviour
(MECB), (Path Following (PF), Collision Avoidance (CA))
and High Energy Consumption Behaviour (HECB) (Path
Following in High Speed (PFH)). Note that other USV
behaviours, including Standby (SB), Ready (RE), Dispatched
(DP), Arrive (AR), are treated separately because they con-
sume very little energy and the energy consumption effect
will be negligible by the environmental factors. For simpli-
fication, we assume that the energy consumption amount of
these behaviours is 0.
Various kinds of combinations of the energy consumption
conditions and behaviours of the USV will lead to the corre-
sponding state transitions of the energy consumption module,
including the amount of the battery level to be subtracted and
the states of the energy consumption module. The amount of
energy consumption is given as following: Very Low Energy
Consumption (VLEC) (-0), Low Energy Consumption (LEC)
(-1), Medium Energy Consumption (MEC) (-2), High Energy
Consumption (HEC) (-3) and Very High Energy Consumption
(VHEC) (-4). The relations between the energy consumption
condition, the USV behaviour and the energy consumption
amount is shown in Table I, which is self-explanatory. For
instance, when the USV is in Low Energy Consumption
Behaviour (LECB) and the energy consumption condition
is also Low Energy Consumption Condition (LECC), the
consumed energy will be Very Low Energy Consumption
(VLEC).
TABLE I: The relations between energy consumption con-
ditions, USV behaviours and energy consumption amount
LECC MECC HECC
LECB VLEC (0) LECC (-1) MECC (-2)
MECB LEC (-1) MEC (-2) HEC (-3)
HECB MEC (-2) HEC (-3) VHEC (-4)
3) Battery: The battery level is represented by an integer
from 0 to 10. The accumulation of the energy consump-
tion amount and the energy generation amount will be the
changing amount of the battery level. For example, if the
current state of the battery level is 5, the state of the energy
generation module is Low Energy Generation (LEG, +1)
and the state of the energy consumption module is Medium
Energy Consumption (MEC, -2), then the next state of the
battery level will be updated to be (5 + 1− 2 = 4).
C. Kripke model for USV
The behaviours of the USV are defined as follows: SB,
RE, DP, PF, PFH, CA, SK, SFA(Severe Fault), FA(Fault) and
AR. In this mission scenario, the battery level is taken into
account in the decision making system. When the battery
level is 0 and 1, the USV should be in SB or SFA state
and the diesel generator will be triggered to generate power.
When the battery level is 2, the USV can be SK, CA, SB or
SFA state and turn off the diesel generator. When the battery
level is above 3, the USV can be in PF, SK, CA, RE, DP, SB
or FA state. When the battery level is above 9 and the energy
consumption condition is LECC and the energy generation
condition is HEGC, the USV will choose PFH state other
than PF for maximising the utilisation of natural energy. The



















































Fig. 4: Kripke model for the USV
• t1: If the USV received the mission from the GCS, no
fault is detected and battery level is above 2.
• t2: If the USV received the launching command from
GCS and no fault is detected.
• t3: If the USV has been dispatched and no fault is
detected.
• t4: If the USV arrived the destination.
• t12, t9, t11, t26: If the USV is in PF, PFH, CA or SK,
no giving-way collision risk is detected; communication
channel is in good status; no fault is detected; and the
battery level is above 2.
• t8, t13, t14, t22: If the USV is in PF, PFH, CA or SK,
a giving-way collision risk is detected; communication
channel is in good status; no fault is detected; and the
battery level is above 1.
• t10, t15, t16, t24: If the USV is in PF, PFH, CA or SK,
no giving-way collision risk detected; communication
channel is lost; no severe fault is detected; and the
battery level is above 1; or fault event is detected and
no collision risk is detected; or no fault is detected; the
battery level is 2; and no collision risk is detected.
• t5, t6, t7, t18, t17, t20: If the USV has detected severe
faults.
• t19: If the USV is in the SFA state.
• t28, t29: If the USV battery level is 0 or 1.
• t25, t23, t21, t27: If there is no give-way collision risk;
no fault detected; battery is above 8; and the energy
generation is higher than energy consumption.
D. Kripke model for GCS
The behaviours of the GCS are defined as follows: Path
Planning (PP), Send Waypoints (SW), Launch Command
(LC), Situation Analysis (SiA), Path Re-planning (PR) and
Send New Waypoint (SN). Fig. 5 shows the Kripke model of
the GCS behaviours. The transitions and the corresponding


























Fig. 5: Kripke model for the GCS
• t1: If the GCS is in PP state and the USV is in SB state.
• t2: If the GCS is in SW and the USV is in the DP state.
• t3: If the GCS is in LC state and the USV is in the PF
state.
• t4: If the GCS is in the SiA state, the USV is in the SK
state and the communication state gets recovered.
• t6: If the GCS is in the PR state.
• t5: If the GCS is in the SN state and the USV is in the
PF mode.
• t7, t8, t9, t10, t11, t12: If the USV has detected fault and
the communication status is normal.
IV. MODEL CHECKING WITH MCMAS
The Kripke models are translated into the ISPL code,
the modelling language of MCMAS, which is an open-
source model checker designed for verification of Multi-
Agent Systems. The desirable properties are expressed using
CTL formulaes and implemented into the Evaluation and
Formulae part of MCMAS. Finally the properties are verified
using MCMAS. The details are presented in the following
subsections.
A. MCMAS model
MCMAS uses its own language ISPL to describe the
system model. ISPL has six essential parts including Envi-
ronment Agent, Agent, InitStates, Evaluation, and Formulae.
In the Environment Agent and Agent, the possible states, the
labelling function and transitions of the Kripke model can be
parsed using state variables, actions, protocols and evolution.
The InitStates defines the initial states of all agents. The
atomic propositions of the properties to be verified are de-
clared in Evaluation. These propositions and CTL are used to
describe how the behaviours of the system unfold over time.
The properties that we want to verify are expressed in the
Formulae part. The states of the Agents are described in Vars.
Each Agent is allowed to perform some Actions, which are
visible by other Agents. The Actions correspond to the atomic
propositions of the Kripke model. The Protocols of the Agent
correspond to the labelling function of Kripke model. The
Protocols describe which actions can be performed in each
Fig. 6: ISPL code for Evaluation, Formulae and InitStates
state, and that corresponds to which atomic proposition those
hold in each state. The Evolution functions for an agent
describes how the states transit as a result of the actions
performed by all other agents, which correspond to the
transition relations of the Kripke model that describe the
condition of the state transitions. Following this principle, the
Kripke models of communication, communication detector
traffic information, AIS, fault event, fault detector, the USV
and the GCS were translated into the ISPL code.
B. Modelling of properties to be verified
Considering the real world missions of the C-Enduro USV,
there are fourteen properties verified, given as below:
1) After the USV received the mission (ready state), if
the communication state is good; no fault detected by
the USV; and the USV battery level is above 2, then
the GCS sends the launching command and the USV
will transit to DP.
2) When the USV is in PF; no fault is detected; the USV
battery level is above 2; and a give-way collision risk
is detected, then the USV will always change its way
to avoid collision.
3) If the give-way collision does not appear, the USV will
never alter its way to avoid the collision.
4) After the USV avoided the collision risk, if the com-
munication state is good; no give-way collision risk
and fault are detected; and the USV battery level is
above 2, then the USV will always continue to follow
the path at its normal speed.
5) When the USV is in SK; no fault is detected; GCS is in
the situation analysis state under good communication
state, the GCS will re-plan the path. Formula 5 is used
for checking if the GCS can perform path replanning
behaviours successfully when the communication gets
recovered.
6) When the USV is in PF, if there is no give-way
collision risk and fault event detected; the USV battery
level is above 2; and the communication is lost, the
USV will change to station keeping state. Formula 6
is for checking the part of safety property that when
the USV lost communication signals, it will transit to
SK until the signal gets recovered.
7) When the USV is in SK, if the communication state is
good and the USV battery level is above 2, after the
GCS send the new waypoints, the USV will change to
path following state.
8) When the USV is in PF and no fault detected, if
communication lost is detected, the USV will change
to SK.
9) If the communication is not lost or the USV battery
level is not below 3 or there is no fault detected, the
USV will not station keeping. Formula 9 means the
USV will only trigger the SK behaviour under the right
situations (Communication lost, battery level is low or
fault detected).
10) If communication is lost, the USV will change to SB
or SK. Formula 10 is used for checking the safety
property.
11) If the USV is in severe fault state, the USV will change
to the SB state directly. Formula 11 represents that
under the severe fault event situation, the USV will
transit to SB directly for safety.
12) If the battery level is less than 2, the USV will not
follow the path.
13) When the USV is in PF or CA; the battery level is
9; energy generation is high; energy consumption is
low; no give-way collision risk detected; and no fault
detected, the USV will change to PFH.
14) If the battery level is not above 8, the USV will never
transit to PFH.
The CTL Formula of the first property is given below for
demonstration:
AG((USV.state = RE ∧ Communicationdetector.state
= DCS ∧ Faultdetector.state
= DNF ∧GCS.state
= LC ∧Battery.state
> 2)→ AX(USV.state = DP ))
Note that AG and AX are CTL operator: AG(p) means
along All paths p holds Globally; AX(p) means along All
paths, p holds in the neXt state. The verification of Formula
1 and initial states are expressed in Evaluation, Formulae
and InitStates, as shown in Fig. 6. Other Formulas were also
translated from their CTL accordingly.
C. Verification result and analysis
The program was executed on a 2.7 GHz Intel Core
i7-6820HK processor with 16.0 GB RAM. The number
of reachable states approached 209286 when the decision
making system was verified and the execution time was 0.632
seconds. The verification results are shown in Fig. 7. In
the verification results, Formula 4, Formula 7 and Formula
8 have FALSE result and the other Formulas have TRUE
results. Formula 1 acquires the TRUE result and it shows that
the launching behaviour can perform well. The verification
results of Formula 2 and 3 show that the collision avoidance
command can be executed properly. The verification results
of Formula 12, 13 and 14 show that the USV possesses the
long endurance/energy saving properties: When the battery
level is low, the USV will be in SB or SK; When the battery
Fig. 7: Verification results
-------- State 14 --------
Agent Environment
  state = CS
Agent Communicationdetector
  state = DCS
Agent Collision
  state = NC
Agent AIS
  state = DNC
Agent Fault
  state = NF
Agent FaultDetector
  state = DNF
Agent EGC
  state = HEGC
Agent EGM
  state = HEG
Agent ECC
  state = MECC
Agent ECM
  state = LEC
Agent Battery
  state = 10
Agent GCS
  state = SN
Agent USV
  state = CA
-------- State 15 --------
Agent Environment
  state = CS
Agent Communicationdetector
  state = DCS
Agent Collision
  state = NC
Agent AIS
  state = DNC
Agent Fault
  state = NF
Agent FaultDetector
  state = DNF
Agent EGC
  state = MEGC
Agent EGM
  state = MEG
Agent ECC
  state = HECC
Agent ECM
  state = HEC
Agent Battery
  state = 10
Agent GCS
  state = SN
Agent USV
  state = PFH
Fig. 8: Counterexample of Formula 4
level is high, and the energy generation is higher than the
energy consumption, the USV will be in PFH; If the battery
level is not above 8, the USV will never travel in high speed.
Using the show counterexample/witness option, the error
trace of Formula 4, Formula 7 and Formula 8 can be
acquired. By checking the counterexample of Formula 4,
as shown in Fig. 8, we found the USV transits to PFH
instead of PF, because the record shows that the battery level
was 10 and the energy generation was higher than energy
consumption. It is reasonable to accelerate to maximise the
utilisation of the natural energy. When Formula 4 is changed
to “USV will transit to PF or PFH”, the verification result
became TRUE. The verification record of Formula 7 shows
that after the GCS sent a new waypoint and the USV detected
a collision risk, so it is transited to collision avoidance state
instead of path following to ensure USV safety. Therefore,
this counterexample is reasonable. The verification result
of Formula 8 shows that when the USV is following the
path, and the communication is lost and it also detected the
give-way collision risk at the same time, it will transit to
collision avoidance state first instead of the station keeping
state, compliant with the safety design of the decision making
system.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This research tackled the problem of applying model
checking method for verifying the decision-making be-
haviours of a long endurance USV, which may encounter
communication lost, collision risk, malfunction and max-
imising energy utilisation problems. The Kripke model and
CTL were applied to construct the model of environmental
factors and autonomous systems. Finally, both the safety
properties and the long endurance properties of the decision
making behaviours under concurrent and non-deterministic
uncertainties were verified using MCMAS. The short pro-
gram executing time (0.632 seconds) also implies that more
complex scenario and more agents can be handled by model
checker MCMAS. In the future work, multiple USVs cooper-
ation or UAVs-USVs cooperation can be taken into account
in complex scenarios. State space reduction techniques may
be required for saving computing resources. A translation
programme which transforms a system design to a model
checker language will reduce the potential mistakes from the
designer.
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